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Chair’s Address
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei	
  Studies	
  Group	
  

Association	
  for	
  Asian	
  Studies	
  

Greetings! I am happy to introduce a sparkling new Berita newsletter edited by Derek
Heng of Ohio State
	
   University. After the successful editorship of Ron Provencher from
Northern Illinois 	
   University, we had a bit of a lull in trying to figure out how to restart
the newsletter. Thankfully,
Derek volunteered to take over and what you now have is
	
  
largely due to his hard work.
Chair’s	
  Address…..……………………………………………………………………………….....…...…………2	
  
Editor’s	
  Foreword…………………………………………………………….….…………….…………….………3	
  
The objective of this new series of Berita is to provide a forum for scholars of Malaysia,
Members’	
  
Updates……………………………………………….………………………….….………………….4	
  
Singapore, and Brunei
to share
short articles about politics, society, history, literature,
Prizes.…...................………………………………..…………………………………………………..……..……4	
  
and the arts that will be of broad interest, as well as to provide useful information on
Announcements...........................................................................................................6	
  
fieldwork, archives,
conferences, and other such resources for the scholarly community.
Elections	
  and	
  
Ethnic	
  
and	
  Rand
eligious	
  
Politics……………....……….………….……..7	
  
Thus, you will Competitive	
  
find both substantive
short
essays
practical
information about
Malaysia and Singapore.
(Unfortunately,
is underrepresented,
I encourage
Malaysia's	
  
2013	
  Election:	
  TBrunei
he	
  Nation	
  
and	
  the	
  National	
  Fand
ront....……………………...…....14
anyone doing research
on
Brunei
to
write
for
our
newsletter.)
Transforming	
  Melayu	
  Identities	
  in	
  Maritime	
  Southeast	
  Asia......................……….…….21	
  
What	
  Islam,	
  Who's	
  Islam?.……………………………………………............………….…………….....25	
  
I will leave the 	
  introduction of the essays to Derek, but I will just conclude by noting
that Berita is now
	
   experimenting with various ideas to engage our audience. There is
much that can be discussed in these pages and to the extent that you find something
lacking in this edition of Berita, we are most happy to hear from you. Therefore, if you
have any projects or ideas you would like to contribute to Berita, please email me
(erik.kuhonta@mcgill.ca) or Derek Heng (heng.5@osu.edu). We are especially interested
in publishing articles, book reviews, or views from the field from graduate students.
Lastly, please note that our annual business meeting at the Association for Asian
Studies will take place on Friday April 1 in the Honolulu Convention Center, room 309
from 7:15-9:15pm. At this meeting we will also present the John Lent Prize for best
paper presented at the previous meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. This is the
first time we will be presenting this prize, which will now become an annual event. After
the meeting, we will have out customary dinner in a Southeast Asian (hopefully
Malaysian!) restaurant.
I look forward to seeing many of you in Honolulu!
Erik Martinez Kuhonta, McGill University
Chair, Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group
Association for Asian Studies
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Chair’s Address
I am pleased to report that at our business meeting at the Association for Asian Studies (AAS)
conference in San Diego on 22 March 2013, the Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group (MSB)
awarded the John A. Lent Prize for Best Paper on Malaysia, Singapore, or Brunei presented at the
previous annual meeting to Thomas Pepinsky, an assistant professor at Cornell University. Thomas’
paper “Tak Nak Mereform: New Media and Malaysian Politics in Historical Perspective” was selected
to be the best of the fine papers read. The prize committee, chaired by Patricia Sloane-White of the
University of Delaware, included Sharon Carstens and Cheong Soon Gan, a former recipient of this
prize.
I am also very happy to announce that we awarded the Ronald Provencher Travel Grant for the
first time to Trixie Tangit, a Malaysian doctoral candidate at the Australian National University.
Her extended paper abstract “If you are Kadazan, then speak Kadazan: Negotiating the culture and
politics of standard language versus ‘mother tongue’ language among Kadazans in Sabah, MalaysianBorneo” was selected to be the best submitted.
At the business meeting, chaired by Vice-Chair Eric C. Thompson in my absence, Patricia SloaneWhite was appointed to serve another year as the chair of the John A. Lent Award Committee.
James Jesudson, a distinguished scholar and veteran MSB member, and Thomas Pepinsky, this year’s
winner, will join Patricia on this committee. It was decided that dues and donations for MSB for this
year would be made through the AAS website. I have been receiving reports of these payments from
AAS. Thanks for your kind support!
Discussions about how to enhance MSB communications were also continued at the meetings. It
was decided that for the time being, at least, that we maintain both platforms: the MSB listserv and
Facebook group. Interactions and sharing has increased on both venues. I urge all MSB members
and supporters to increase their active participation in discussions and sharing information in these
media.
Timothy P. Daniels, Hofstra University
Chair, Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group
Timothy.P.Daniels@hofstra.edu
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Editor’s Foreword
I am pleased to present, after a period of hiatus, the Berita Newsletter for Autumn 2013.
Appreciation is extended to the many contributors for their articles, comments and announcements
that are included in this issue.
The theme of this issue is Malaysian politics and the role of ethnic identity and religion in society.
2013 has been a tumultuous year in Malaysian politics. Following the dissolution of parliament on
the 3rd of April 2013, and the Malaysian general elections held on the 5th of May 2013, there has
been significant discussions concerning the implications of the voting patterns and electoral results,
and what these data sets imply in terms of the development and trajectory of Malaysian political
society henceforth. Two feature articles in this issue, by Kikue Hamayotsu and Amrita Malhi,
showcase the diverse currents in these scholarly discourses, examining and postulating the
implications on the institutional strategies and social trajectories of the key stakeholders in
Malaysian body politic.
A key theme that has emerged in the series of discussions carried out on various platforms over
2013 has been the issue of religion and its implication on identity formation and the operations of
social groups within the context of Malaysia. Eric Thompson's summation of the MSB-sponsored
panel at the 2013 AAS meeting at San Diego, entitled "Transforming Melayu Identities in Maritime
Southeast Asia", demonstrates that identity discourse is still very much a salient part of everyday
life, fluid in interpretation, presentation, and implication, and not just historic, but also in the
present.
Along this grain, we are also delighted to include an edited transcript of Zainah Anwar's keynote
speech at the AAS meeting at San Diego entitled "What Islam, Who’s Islam? The Struggle for
Women's Rights to Equality and Justice in Muslim Contexts". In it, she draws the links, and
contradictions, between the interpretation and presentation of Islam to women, to challenges
confronting NGOs in the face of such interpretations and presentations in an Islamic society, and
where the paths of reconciliation may lie.
This issue is perhaps the most substantial one we have had the honour of producing, and I would
like to extend my gratitude to all contributors for a wonderful issue of Berita!

Derek Heng, Yale-NUS College
Editor
Derek-heng@yale-nus.edu.sg

	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Autumn	
  2013	
  

	
  

Berita	
  

4	
  

_______________________________________________________________________________	
  
	
  

Members’ Updates
Derek Heng was recently appointed Head of
the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies. The centre conducts
research into the pre-modern and early modern
history of Southeast Asia, with a special
emphasis on trans-regional exchanges, state
formation processes, and culture and identity.
The centre is presently embarking on a digital
humanities project.

Sharon Carstens (Professor of Anthropology
and Director of the Institute for Asian Studies,
Portland State University) will be conducting
sabbatical research in Malaysia from Jan - May
2014. The title of her new project is "Language
Ideologies and Identities: Multi-lingual Chinese
in Multi-ethnic Malaysia."
Khoo Gaik Cheng (Associate Professor, School
of Modern Languages and Cultures, The
University of Nottingham--Malaysia) teaches
film and cultural studies. She recently co-edited
(with Julian C.H. Lee) a special issue for
Citizenship Studies, “New Ethnoscapes and
different forms of belonging in Malaysia,” Vol.
18, No. 8, forthcoming December 2014 (based
on a Wenner Gren Foundation workshop
grant). She is also working on a book entitled
Food, Space and Identity in Malaysia and
Singapore with co-author Jean Duruz, and is
helping to organize the Association of
Southeast Asian Cinemas conference (Salaya
July 2014). Her research interests include film,
food and cosmopolitanism.

Patricia Hardwick (Fellow, Institute of Sacred
Music, Yale University) is an anthropologist
and folklorist. She is presently working on a
monograph that investigates how mak yong
practitioners, confronted with changing
interpretations of appropriate Islamic practice,
are actively adapting how they think and speak
about traditional Kelantanese Malay notions of
the body, the origins of illness, and their
healing performances. A former Fulbright and
Javits Fellow, Patricia has done fieldwork in
California,
Malaysia,
and
Singapore
documenting how individuals negotiate ethnic,
religious, and historical identities through the
performing arts. Her research has been
published as book chapters and articles.

Prizes
university-level mass communications program at
Universiti Sains Malaysia, and has been professor at
Temple University since 1974.

John A. Lent Prize (2013, San
Diego)

Over the years, Prof. Lent has written monographs and
many articles on Malaysian mass media, animation, and
cartooning. He is the author and editor of seventy-one
books and monographs, and hundreds of articles and book
chapters. Since 1994, he has chaired the Asian Cinema
Society and has been the editor of the journal Asian
Cinema. He publishes and edits International Journal of
Comic Art, which he started in 1999, and is chair of
Asian Research Center on Animation and Comic Art and

Prof. John A. Lent founded Berita in 1975, editing it for
twenty-six
years,
and
founded
the
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group in 1976,
serving as chair for eight years. He has been a university
faculty member since 1960, in Malaysia, the Philippines,
China, and various U.S. universities. From 1972-74,
Prof. Lent was founding director of Malaysia's first
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and class fall away, new forces may appear on
the landscape. But the terms and the result of
the political contestation will remain, he argues,
perniciously the same.

Asian-Pacific Association of Comic Art, both of which he
established, and are located in China.

The Committee for the John A. Lent
Prize for the best paper on Malaysia, Singapore,
and Brunei presented to the AAS in the
previous year has chosen as its winner Thomas
Pepinsky, for his paper “Tak Nak Mereform:
New Media and Malaysian Politics in Historical
Perspective.” The three committee members all
agreed that Pepinsky’s paper deserves special
recognition for its compelling and persuasive
argument and the high quality of its writing.

In this well-written paper, Pepinsky
engages with multiple academic analysts who
are more optimistic over prospects of
realignment in Malaysian politics arising from
the formation of new coalitions and new tactics
within protest movements. He supports his
argument with three well-chosen (and wellknown) examples of recent political movements:
the Hindraf rally of 2007, the March 2008
General elections, and the 2011 Bersih 2.0 rally.
Although other scholars might reach a different
conclusion than his, Pepinsky’s perspective on
Malaysian politics provides a useful framework
for comprehending both the challenges to and
the resilience of the current political structure
and is important precisely because it sets the
parameters for a necessary debate.

Thomas Pepinsky’s timely paper asks,
as many scholars of the politics of
democratization today do, if the technologies of
new media and a broadening online society
“augur well for political liberalization.” This is a
particularly relevant question in Malaysia,
where ordinary citizens and the country’s
official opposition have successfully harnessed
technology to undermine the incumbent
“Barisan National regime’s organizational and
informational advantages.” Pepinsky’s approach
is striking because he places what is indeed
“new” in Malaysia—the growth of diverse news
media and a vibrant online society that flourish
beyond the reach of state censorship and
political control, as well as new tactics and new
kinds of social actors—within what might be
called the longue durée of six decades of
Malaysian politics to demonstrate that the
essential logic and deep structure of (and
arguments within) Malaysian politics have not
changed. Thus Pepinsky argues that despite
mobilization of new segments of society, aided
by changes in the economy, society and
technology, any fundamental reordering of the
political structures that have underpinned
Malaysian politics since independence is
unlikely to take place. Until what he calls the
“cleavage structures” that center on ethnicity

Finally, it gives the John A. Lent Prize
Committee particular pleasure to note that
Pepinsky’s paper addresses the relationship
among what he calls the “emancipatory
potential of new technology,” media, and social
change, a topic that parallels and resonates with
John A. Lent’s own research interests.

Ronald Provencher Travel Grant
(2013, San Diego)
The Ronald Provencher Travel Grant is named in
honour of Ronald Provencher, distinguished cultural
anthropologist of Malaysia, a long-time leader of the
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group (Association
for Asian Studies) and editor of Berita Newsletter. It
carries with it a US$750 award for a graduate student
from Malaysia, Singapore or Brunei to travel to present a
paper at the Association for Asian Studies meeting.
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The Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei
Studies Group (MSB) has awarded its first
Ronald Provencher Travel Grant to Trixie
Tangit, a doctoral candidate at the Australian
National University, for her extended proposal
for the paper titled, “‘If you are Kadazan, then
speak Kadazan’: Negotiating the culture and
politics of standard language versus ‘mother
tongue’ language among Kadazans in Sabah,
Malaysian-Borneo.” She presented this paper at
the 2013 AAS Meetings on the panel,
“Negotiating the Culture and Politics of
Language Choice in Contemporary Malaysia,”
organized and chaired by Sharon Carstens.

Languages and Cultures for the Kadazandusun
Language Foundation (KLF) Sabah, Malaysia.
Trixie Tangit’s extended paper
proposal reviewed much of the pertinent
literature about language use among Kadazans,
which describes their language shifts to Malay
and a ‘mixed language’ comprised of Malay,
English, and Kadazan. She used text analysis
and ethnographic interview data to highlight
Kadazan perceptions of linguistic elements,
language ideology, and sites of identity, and to
argue that Kadazans view the Kadazandusun
language as ‘Dusunizing’ them. This proposed
research paper, an integral part of her doctoral
research, potentially makes a major
contribution to the literature by explaining how
Kadazan language ideology articulates with
ethnic identity and belonging in Sabah.

Trixie Tangit is a Malaysian from
Sabah with a background in linguistics and
experience working with local ethnic groups.
She earned her M.A. in Linguistics at the
University of Hawaii, Honolulu in 2005, and
worked as a Research Officer on Indigenous

Announcements
Conference Announcements

New Film

Title: Security, Sovereignty and SocioEconomic Development: Asia-Pacific
Island Issues in the Early 21st
Century
Venue: Penang, Malaysia
Date: 1st & 2nd February 2014.
Organisers: Institute of Ethnic Studies,
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
(KITA-UKM, Malaysia) and the
Asia-Pacific Islands Program at
Southern Cross University
(Australia) in collaboration with
SICRI – The Small Island Cultures
Research Initiative.

Di Ambang: Stateless in Sabah follows the
lives of two undocumented Filipino migrant
families, one ethnic Suluk and one Bajau, living
in the Malaysian state of Sabah. Fleeing conflict
in the southern Philippines, thousands have
migrated across Malaysia’s porous sea borders.
Following the families through their day-to-day
lives, this documentary explores statelessness
and the consequences it has on the generations
of people living unrecognized by any country.
The website with the trailer can be found at
http://diambangfilm.com/.
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Special Report 1

(Pakatan Rakyat, PR)? Will the democracy
under PR be significantly different from the
polity we have seen in Malaysia under the
National Front (Barisan Nasional, henceforth
BN) in terms of equality and equity among
various communities? Have issues, ideologies,
and institutions of identity, ethnicity and
religion in particular, receded or increased as a
result of more competitive elections? If so,
why?

Competitive Elections and Ethnic
and Religious Politics in a
transforming Malaysia 1
(By Kikue Hamayotsu)
It is a well-established proposition in
political science that it is difficult to achieve
and maintain stable democratic rule in a plural
society (Lijphart 1977). Some also argue that
competitive elections, a minimal procedural
condition in a modern democracy, could
potentially generate more instability and
violence rather than rectifying them in such a
society (Snyder 2000). Regardless of who is in
power, the challenges of maintaining delicate
ethnic relations will remain the same in a
deeply divided society like Malaysia.

	
  

In order to address these broader
questions beyond the immediate outcomes of
the 13th General Elections held on May 5,
2013, this essay seeks to place the recent
political development in a broader perspective
that pertains to the questions of identity,
religion and ethnicity. The findings and
arguments I present here are mostly based on
primary data I gathered through fieldwork, indepth interviews and online research.

In spite of extraordinary economic,
socio-cultural and political transformations
over the past decades, the basic characteristics
of Malaysia’s “plural society” politics, and
ethnic-based mobilization in particular, have
remained remarkably the same (Pepinsky 2009,
2011).

My primary findings suggest that
ethnocentric and communal sentiments are in
fact on the rise, especially among the
traditional and religious elites in the Malay
community. I argue that the rise of ultranationalistic and antagonistic attitudes is the
result of the expansion of an unprecedentedly
assertive pro-democracy movement and multiethnic opposition.

Will Malaysia’s increasingly
competitive elections and more liable and
assertive “multi-ethnic” opposition bring about
more equality, equity and stability, as promised
by the opposition coalition, People’s Alliance
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1 An early draft of this article was posted in
Mandala: New Perspectives on Mainland
Southeast Asia on May 17, 2013
(http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/20
13/05/17/revisiting-democracy-in-pluralsocieties-in-transforming-malaysia/).

The pro-democracy movement’s
emphasis on equal rights and equitable
development for all Malaysians has threatened
not only the party-dominant regime but also
the pro-Malay principles and institutions,
including sultans and religious authorities.
The perception that the movement is
dominated by urban-middle class interests,
especially non-Muslim communities, also has
contributed to rising tensions between the
majority Malay-Muslims and the rest of the
Malaysian populations. The prospects for
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democratic transition and consolidation do not
appear to be as bright as the election results of
2008 and 2013 indicate.

(Pakatan Rakyat 2013). The national and
democratic vision based on equality and
equality among all Malaysians certainly
sounds good and has worked well to win more
urban and young pro-reform voters. Alongside
unprecedentedly active participation of
Malaysian citizens in anti-regime movement
and street demonstrations since 2007, this
encouraging development seems to be evidence
of growing political awareness and maturity, at
least among urban voters who overwhelmingly
supported the opposition.

The political use of ethnicity and religion
in election campaigns: political learning
and ideological moderation
On the positive side, one finding that
could be highlighted and commended in the
recent election, GE13, is that the use of
parochial ethnic sentiments and symbols for
short-term electoral gains was not as
conspicuous as some observers may have
expected.

Have such universalistic campaigns of
PR worked for all the component parties to
bring the impressive electoral showing for the
opposition seen in 2013? It is helpful to
carefully look at the broader voting patterns
after the onset of the 1998-99 political crisis
and the reformasi movement in order to better
understand why ultra-nationalistic sentiments
and antagonistic attitudes are on the rise
among the Malay-Muslim community. The
election results seem to suggest some
interesting, and potentially worrying, patterns
and dynamics.

To be sure, there were ultranationalistic (and frankly racist) rhetoric and
claims circulated in mainstream media by proregime forces, most famously Perkasa.
Founded by the former UMNO politician from
Kelantan, Ibrahim Ali, in the aftermath of the
General Elections in 2008, Perkasa is
committed to the promotion of Malay
supremacy and privileges. However, this
ethnocentric and xenophobic rhetoric and
mobilization aimed at inciting ultranationalistic sentiments has proven to be
ineffective and counterproductive, as seen in
the defeat of Ibrahim in his home state of
Kelantan. Moreover, physical violence related
to ethnic or religious divisions has largely been
restrained.
Overall, the PR—as well as the ruling
coalition—has been reasonably successful in
overcoming and limiting narrow parochial
ethnic and religious sentiments and agendas in
running election campaigns. Instead, PR has
focused on pragmatic—and universalistic—
values and programs such as equal rights and
equitable development, clean and fair elections,
elimination of corruption and money politics,
and transparent and accountable governance
	
  
	
  

First, as seen in the table (Table 1)
below, the opposition coalition parties, namely
the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan
Rakyat, PKR), the Democratic Action Party
(DAP) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti
Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), collectively have won
significant support in terms of the number of
votes and parliamentary seats against BN
especially in the last two general elections in
2008 and 2013. In 2008, the ruling coalition
has lost a two-third majority in parliament as
well as five states in Kedah, Kelantan, Penang,
Perak and Selangor.2 In 2013, BN suffered its
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2 PR has been removed from power in Perak
after the election due to the defection of three
assemblymen.
	
  

	
  

	
  

Autumn	
  2013	
  

	
  

	
  
Berita	
  

9	
  

_______________________________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
worst electoral result since 1969 when it lost
more votes than the opposition.

additional seats to the 26 seats it gained in
2008.

Second, it is the predominantly
By stark contrast, the performances of
Chinese
the other two
DAP who
predominantTable 1: Number of seats and votes won by BN and PR (1999has gained
ly Malay
2013)
the most
partners were
	
  
from the
less successful
BN
PR
antithan DAP in
Seats
Seats	
  (%) Votes	
  (%) Seats
Seats	
  (%) Votes	
  (%) Total
regime
both in 2008
1999
148
76.68
56.5
45
23.32
43.5
193
movement
and 2013,
2004
198
90.41
63.9
21
9.59
36.1
219
and has
despite having
2008
140
62.61
52.2
82
36.93
47.8
222
expanded
contested far
2013
133
59.91
47.38
89
40.09
50.87
222
its support
more electoral
Source: The Election Commission of Malaysia; The Star Online: 13th
base,
districts.
Malaysian General Election; the author’s own data.	
  
although
PKR, led by
PR
the
	
  
contested parliamentary seats under single
charismatic and popular icon of the opposition
tickets. In 1999 in the aftermath of the political
movement, Anwar Ibrahim, only managed to
crisis after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim, as
win less than a half of the constituencies they
seen in the table (Table 2) below, DAP won
contested (49% in 2008 and 41% in 2013). PAS
only 10 seats (27%) out of the 37 seats it
won only 23 (35%) out of 65 seats and 21 (33%)
contested in peninsular Malaysia (excluding
out of 66 seats they contested in 2008 and 2013
the eastern states, Sabah and Sarawak). The
respectively. Among those 21 seats it won in
result
2013, 9 seats
Table 2. The number of electoral districts the opposition
indicates
are in
parties contested and won
that the
Kelantan, the
	
  
reformasi
location of
PKR*
DAP
PAS
PRM
movement
much of their
Contest
Win
Contest
Win
Contest
Win
Contest Win
GE10	
  (1999)
42
5
37
10
60
27
4
0
PKR*=	
  Keadilan+PRM
and the
support base
12%
27%
45%
0
declining
before the
GE11	
  (2004)
47
1
38
11
83
7
2%
28%
8%
popularity
onset of the
GE12	
  (2008)
63
31
35
26
65
23
49%
74%
35%
of BN
anti-regime
GE13	
  (2013)
64
26
36
31
66
21
(especially
41%
81%
33%
	
   movement.
Source:
Author's
calculation
based
on
the
results
available
from
the
UMNO)
Overall,
http://elections.thestar.com.my/.	
  
had little
PAS’s growth
	
  
to do with
in the postDAP or non-Malay voters. Since then,
reformasi era remains modest despite the
however, DAP’s growth in popularity is by far
growing anti-regime movement. The limited
the most conspicuous among the three
expansion of PAS may be even more
coalition partners. In 2013, DAP achieved an
perplexing if we remember that PAS was the
overwhelming victory winning as many as 31
most viable alternative opposition party to
seats (81%) out of the 36 seats it contested, 5
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UMNO up till the onset of the 1998-99
political crisis.

constituencies. Both in 2008 and 2013, PAS’
contribution to the opposition’s victories
remain modest and obviously less than DAP’s,
despite the fact that there are
disproportionately more Malay-majority
electoral districts that PAS (and PKR) are
likely to contest.

Third, to make the already
disappointing situation worse, so-called rising
young “progressive” pro-reform leaders from
PAS, Dzulkefly Ahmad, Mohamad Sabu,
Husam Musa and Salahuddin Ayub, have lost
not only in UMNO’s strong hold, Johor but
also other states such as Kedah and Selangor.
According to these results, PAS and its
moderate and pro-reform leaders in particular
are not gaining much ground in the urban
constituencies despite their efforts to alter the
old ultra-conservative outlooks and religious
visions of the Islamist party.

A big question now is what would be
an option for PAS. After the 2013 elections,
PAS seems to be suffering from a sense of
defeat, uncertainty, and urgency to reconsider
its position in the coalition and Malaysian
politics in general. The more conservative
religious elites such as former deputy
president, Nasharuddin Mat Isa have been
regaining more force within the party,
although they had been pushed aside as a result
of their resistance against the new direction of
the party (Hamayotsu 2010 ). On the other
hand, some of the pro-reform party leaders
such as Husam Musa and their close allies have
been quietly pushed aside within the party
structure. Are the political and ideological
costs they are paying small enough for them to
stay as they are?

With everything equal, these results
may not simply be attributed to strategic
miscalculation (e.g., a wrong candidate in a
wrong constituency), electoral manipulation,
or dirty tactics of the regime. DAP was able to
defeat their BN rivals under the same adverse
institutional and political conditions. Clearly
PAS is not gaining many rewards from their
position in the coalition, their new reformist
identity, and the leadership they have chosen
to adopt at the expense of their traditional
Islamist identity, policies, and leadership. It is
important to realize that PAS’s support base
remains exclusively in Kelantan as it was 10
years ago, in contrast to the assertion that it
has been transformed into a more open and
national party.

The rising pro-Malay-Muslim ultranationalism and inter-ethnic tensions
It is still uncertain how committed the
opposition parties actually are to their
moderate outlooks and a national vision where
all Malaysians are treated equally. The
question looms large because, so far, the
opposition leaders have agreed not to talk
about delicate issues such as issues of ethnicity,
religion, and equity. This agreement is meant
to keep the parties together to achieve their
primary and immediate goal, to oust the
dominant party regime.

It is reasonable to conclude that the
electoral success of the opposition coalition has
much to do with their ability to appeal to more
urban, cosmopolitan, and largely middle-class
constituencies. As widely discussed elsewhere,
BN, and UMNO in particular, has not lost
much support in primarily Malay-dominant
rural constituencies as much as its non-Malay
BN partners have in their non-Muslim

What is more concerning is the rise of
ultra-nationalistic and antagonistic attitudes
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among the Muslim-Malay community,
especially traditional Malay and religious elites
including sultans and state religious officials,
which have led to inter-ethnic tensions since
2007. The trend is intriguing because it has
occurred when the UMNO elites adopted a
more accommodative and integrative approach
to balance out various ethnic interests.

It is in fact the ambiguity about the
special rights of the Muslim-Malay community
and the relations between majority and
minority communities among the prodemocracy movements, especially the PR elites
that has put the traditional Malay and religious
elites on the defensive. The unprecedentedly
assertive pro-democracy civil and political
societies and their emphasis on “equality” and
“equity” are perceived as a threat to the
cultural, religious and political dominance of
the traditional Malay elites, even if the prodemocracy movement is not explicitly
demanding to reduce the privileges and special
rights of Malays. Moreover, both UMNO and
PAS are seen making too many concessions to
the non-Malay communities to achieve
electoral gains, while weakening
organizationally. The fear that the Malays are
losing powers and influence in a Malaysian
society at large has contributed to the rising
ultra-nationalistic sentiments and antagonistic
attitudes among the Malay community, and
traditional elites in particular.

One of the most prominent cases
includes violence and hostility that has
intensified against Christians in regard to the
use of the word Allah. Inter-ethnic tensions
have arisen after the High Court ruled in
December 2009 to overturn a government’s
ban on Roman Catholics using the word as a
translation for God in the Malay languages
edition of their newspaper, the Herald. After
the court ruling, a number of churches, a
convent, and a Sikh temple were attacked
across the country.
After the 2013 elections, inter-ethnic
and religious tensions have deteriorated
further due primarily to the Malay elites’
antagonistic and provocative attitudes against
the constitutional rights and sentiments of
religious minorities. The federal religious
authorities, JAKIM, for example, called for a
“jihad (holy struggle)” among Muslims against
non-Muslims as the hearing of the appeal case
on the use of the word Allah neared. Under
such massive pressures, non-Muslim religious
leaders are doubtful if the judiciary (dominated
by Malays) could be impartial to the interests
and predicaments of non-Malays. Indeed, at
the time of writing, the Court of Appeal ruled
unanimously against allowing the Catholic
Church to use the word Allah in its weekly
publication, saying that the government did
not impugn on the Church’s constitutional
rights in banning the use of the word.

The fear and antagonism among the
Malay elites should be understood against a
historical and institutional context of the state
institutionalization of ethnicity and religion.
The Malaysian constitution is based on ethnic
and religious exclusivism so that the
supremacy of the Malay majority would never
be challenged. Numerous legal codes and
bureaucratic institutions and regulations are
tightly in place to perpetuate the ethnic
divisions and to keep minorities inferior to the
Malay majority. Additionally, the Malaysian
state has reinforced the apparatus of religion it
inherited from the colonial regime, including
the Syariah courts and many other religious
agencies that dispense generous public goods
and services to increasingly pious Malay
community. It is the traditional Malay and
religious elites who have benefitted
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handsomely from the state institutionalization
of ethnicity and religion (exclusively Islam)
and expanded formal powers and authority
under the pro-Malay regime.

elites are equipped with more egalitarian
national ideology and more secular
constitution and legal institutions. It is
speculated that electoral incentives in
democratized and decentralized elections in
part have facilitated the use of religious
symbols and interests by opportunistic
politicians (and religious actors), thereby
leading to anti-minority mobilization and
violence (Hamayotsu 2013).

The question remains if the votes cast
for the opposition are based on a belief that the
powerful and resourceful state institutions and
interests based on ethnic exclusivism will be
reduced when the opposition comes to power.
Or are these votes based on a tacit
understanding that these institutions and
interests—and the Malay supremacy—will
remain intact and a new multi-ethnic regime
will try to figure out a better balance than the
incumbent BN among contending ethnic
interests? What do their power-sharing
formulas look like?

In short, the competitive election and
strong performances of the opposition
certainly have threatened the predominance of
the ruling coalition, BN and UMNO in
particular, while raising the prospect of regime
transition which was never considered possible
a decade ago. It is undeniable that an
unprecedented large number of the Malaysian
electorates are tired of the BN’s decade-long
undemocratic rule and are ready to try out a
new leadership. However, we are not certain if
and how many of them are in fact ready to let
go of the fundamental features of ethno-centric
state institutions and ideology that have
sustained the incumbent regime for so long. If
the votes cast for the opposition are based on a
tacit expectation that the fundamental rules
and state institutions will be unaffected, it
remains to be seen what formula the opposition
leaders intend—and are capable of—to craft in
order to bring about a truly new Malaysia with
equality and equity in a peaceful manner.

Constitutional freedom of individual
citizens in a deeply divided non-secularized
society
An even more challenging question for
Malaysia is if a new and more democratic
regime is able and willing to protect and secure
constitutional rights and freedom of citizens
which do not always come together with
democratic rules and competitive elections in
deeply divided and religious societies. If we
could gain some insight from her Muslim
majority neighbor, Indonesia, the future of
constitutional rights of religious and minority
communities may not be so bright even if
Malaysia somehow attains a new regime and
manages to reduce corruption to attain clean
governance.

The bottom line is that changing the
society and the regime is one thing, and
changing the state is another (Slater 2012). A
tragedy of Malaysia’s plural society is not only
that it is deeply divided socio-economically and
culturally, but also that the state and legal
apparatus have been developed extensively and
effectively to maintain these characters and
structures based on ethnic and religious
cleavages and exclusivism. A regime change in

In a democratic Indonesia, Christian
and Muslim minorities remain vulnerable to
various abuses, intimidation, and
discriminations both by state and societal
actors, although the popularly elected ruling
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itself will not automatically bring the powerful
state down in order to advance a new deal for
all Malaysians that transcends narrow
parochial and emotional boundaries.

Snyder, Jack L. (2000). From Voting to Violence:
Democratization and Nationalist Conflict.
New York: Norton.

References

Kikue Hamayotsu is Associate Professor at the
Department of Political Science, and Faculty
Associate at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies,
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, USA. She
can be reached via e-mail at: khamayotsu@niu.edu.

Hamayotsu, Kikue (2010). "Crises of Identity
in PAS and Beyond: Islam and Politics
in Post 8 March Malaysia", The
Commonwealth Journal of International
Affairs 99 (407):145-57.
----- (2013). "Explaining Religious Violence in
the Context of Democratic Consolidation:
Comparative Cases from West Java,
Indonesia". Paper read at Association
for Asian Studies Annual Meeting,
March 21-14, 2013, at San Diego.
Lijphart, Arend (1977). Democracy in Plural
Socieites: A Comparative Exploration.
New Haven and London: Yale
University Press.
Pakatan Rakyat (2013). The People's Manifesto:
The People's Pact, the People's Hope.
Pakatan Rakyat.
Pepinsky, Thomas (2009). "The 2008
Malaysian Elections: An End to Ethnic
Politics?", Journal of East Asian Studies
9 (1):87-120.
----- (2011). "Tak Nak Mereform: New Media
and Malaysian Politics in Historical
Perspective. Paper read at The Jasmine
Revolution and the "Bamboo"
Fairewall: The Impact of the Internet
and New Social Media on Political
Change in East Asia". August 23-25,
2011, at Center for Asian Democarcy,
University of Louisville.
Slater, Dan (2012). "Strong-State
Democratization in Malaysia and
Singapore", Journal of Democracy 23
(2):19-33.
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Autumn	
  2013	
  

	
  

	
  
Berita	
  

14	
  

_______________________________________________________________________________	
  
	
  

Special Report 2

commentary since May.2 Yet one feature of this
recent election that remains undiscussed is the
extent to which it reveals that BN’s hold over
narratives of the nation’s past, present and
future has weakened considerably over the past
decade. Indeed, the May election has revealed
that BN is no longer assured that it can
smoothly weave narratives of its own history
together with those of the nation’s development
(Hooker 2003:Chp 1).

Malaysia's 2013 Election: The
Nation and the National Front 1
(By Amrita Malhi)
Winning an election may still be one of life’s
great thrills, but the afterglow is diminishing.
(Naim 2013: 1713)

This effect has exposed a heightened
level of contestation about how the nation itself
should be understood—indeed, how it should be
constituted—and this contestation is played out
in several key national spaces in which political
debate is conducted. These spaces include the
federal parliament, in which BN relies on an
electoral gerrymander to retain sufficient seats
to form government; and the public sphere,
which is characterised by the rise of the digital
media and the erosion of older print and
broadcast mediascapes (Surin 2010; Yeoh Seng
Guan 2010). As a result, absolute parliamentary
numbers aside, both spaces are increasingly
fragmented, and are no longer BN’s exclusive
domain.

If ever an election victory could be
interpreted as a humiliation by the winning side,
then the Malaysian federal election, held in May
this year, was profoundly humiliating for the
National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN).
BN won government for the thirteenth
time, and extended its uninterrupted hold on
federal government in Malaysia. It also
continues to hold a majority of states in the
federation. In this sense, BN’s political
primacy—as the sole government Malaysia has
ever known—remains in place, in the nation it
argues its predecessors brought in to being in
1957 (Cheah Boon Kheng 2002; Hooker 2003).

The result is a new narrative instability
in the public sphere, as control over the nation’s
foundational discourses has palpably slipped
away from BN. For example, it is no longer the
sole custodian of the text of the national
constitution, nor can it alone elaborate a
doctrine of multi-ethnic unity in the service of
development. This is because the capacity for
intervention in these two narrative fields is
intrinsically linked with access to three

Aside from remaining in government,
however, BN has nevertheless had to reconcile
itself to a new political environment, in which
its domination of the architecture of ‘the
national’ is no longer guaranteed. The polls and
technics that group together within this new
environment have generated much academic
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1 This article is part of a longer journal article
in progress, currently entitled ‘Malaysian New
Media Campaigning: Cleaving the Nation from
its National Front’. Please direct any comments
or feedback to amrita.malhi@unisa.edu.au.
	
  
	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2 For example, refer to New Mandala:
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/cate
gory/malaysia/; and Tom Pepinsky’s blog:
http://tompepinsky.com/.
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important enablers—which BN once appeared
likely to control with impunity for the indefinite
future. The first two of these enablers were first
lost to BN in 2008, and the 2013 election
confirmed these losses. They consist of the
federal parliamentary supermajority, and
control of every state parliament except for
Kelantan. This year, in addition to these two
facets of its power, BN also lost the national
popular vote, shaking its narrative foundations
even further still.

components. Yet in the contest of narratives
embedded in Malaysian politics, BN’s capacity
to claim that only it can represent the nation
has been a critical feature of its modality for
wielding it. This is particularly the case if
‘power’ is understood very simply as ‘an arbiter
of a menu of actions’ available to a national
executive (Naim 2013: 619). As such, this
erosion of power also underpins and enables an
argument prosecuted since May by the People’s
Alliance coalition (Pakatan Rakyat, or PR) that
it, and not BN, now represents ‘the nation’.
Now that it commands the national popular
vote in addition to strong multi-ethnic
credentials of its own—in addition to three
state governments and the new media public
sphere—PR, in its turn, currently possesses a
greatly enhanced capacity for national claimmaking. In this dynamic, and at least for this
moment, it appears that the nation and its
national front are cleaving apart.

In this new political situation, BN is
unable—for now—to make the very claim that
has always been central to its very political
rationale. This is the claim embodied in its
name: namely that BN alone can unite a multiethnic plural society, protecting each group
from the others’ divergent interests, and acting
as the sole legitimate channel through which
national aspirations should be funneled (Mauzy
1983). Indeed, the 2013 election result does not
only illustrate the extent to which the nation
identifies with the National Front which leads it;
rather it also brings in to question the extent to
which the National Front is able to identify
itself with the nation it leads.

Institutional Capacity
BN’s loss of access to the three enablers
described above is of critical importance because
of the multiple ways in which they enforce each
other. First, it has now decisively, and possibly
even permanently, lost its two-thirds
majority—also known as a supermajority—of
seats in the House of Representatives (Dewan
Rakyat). BN originally lost this supermajority at
the last election in 2008—the first it had
suffered such a loss since 1969. This is therefore
only the second period of time in the nation’s
history during which BN has not held a
supermajority. Indeed, this is the first time this
has happened within the living memory of the
nearly three-quarters of Malaysians who are
younger than forty (Weiss 2013: 308-309).
Further, the historic 2008 result saw BN win
140, or 63 per cent, of 222 seats.

Barisan Nasional can no longer project
its exclusive authority over the national
narrative in the public sphere. This is because
the erosion of its electoral domination carries
profound implications for how BN, the ‘national’
front, projects its affinity with, and its authority
over, the polity and the public known as ‘the
nation’. The crux of these implications is that
BN can no longer smoothly conflate its identity
and interests with those of the nation; whereas
the capacity to do so has been essential to its
exercise of power for more than fifty years.
Granted, ‘power’ is impossible to
quantify as an accumulation of elemental
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This year, rather than make up ground
this year as it had hoped, BN won only 133, or
60 per cent, of 222 seats. The 2013 result has
therefore taken BN back even closer to its 1969
low point, when its predecessor, the Alliance,
won only 77, or 53 per cent, of 144 seats.

up by BN’s predecessors, alongside British
administrators and members of Malaysia’s
various royal families (Cheah Boon Kheng 2002;
Hooker 2003; Sham Saleem Faruqi 2008).
Parliamentary supermajority, the constitution,
and BN have therefore existed in symbiosis
until very recently, and BN has held unchecked
power over both institutions as a result. Indeed,
according to one recent estimate, BN has
invoked its supermajority to author more than
700 amendments to the constitution over the
years since independence (Adilah R.A. Nasir
2013). Now that it can no longer make such
amendments on its own, it can no longer adjust
the nation’s textual foundations to reconfigure
how the polity operates, whenever it judges this
option expedient. This is a significant blow to
BN’s narrative-making power.

In part, the significance of this
supermajority has been found in the way in
which it operates as a form of psychological set
point; a base performance trend line beneath
which confidence plummets in an increasingly
competitive political marketplace. Without it,
BN’s capacity to command parliamentary
authority—even while still in government—is
diminished from its previous peak, rendering it
psychologically enervated and defensive as a
result. The supermajority is also significant
because of the relationship it has underpinned
between BN and the nation’s constitution.
Without an automatic assurance of two-thirds
of the parliamentary vote, BN has also thereby
lost its capacity to unilaterally amend the
constitution.3

BN’s second important loss is that it
can no longer claim to function as a force that
unites discrete ethnic groups, each possessing
distinct, and divergent, interests. This is
because, in federal parliamentary terms, BN is
now barely a multi-ethnic coalition of parties at
all. Of its three component parties, the
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are now
barely represented in the federal parliament at
all, having won only seven and four seats
respectively. As a result, the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO) now dominates
BN, holding 88 of its 133 seats (Suruhanjaya
Pilihan Raya Malaysia 2011). BN is also now
closely identified with the Malay supremacist
organisation, Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa
Malaysia (Perkasa), whose membership largely
overlaps with that of UMNO (Chin 2012: 272).
Perkasa serves a dual purpose for UMNO. It is
both an external body to which UMNO can
outsource its more provocative ethnic wedge
campaigns (Malhi 2010); and a pressure group
constituted both inside and outside UMNO,

The loss of the supermajority, then,
represents a loss to BN of the institutional
capacity it once possessed to ‘[privatise] the
rules and procedures used by a nation-state to
keep control over the activities within its
territory’ (Castells 2008: 81). This loss only
underscores BN’s humiliation again: the
constitution is the nation’s founding document,
statement of fundamental principles, and an
operating manual for the polity. It was drawn
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3 Article 159 of the Constitution allows for its
revision if amendments are supported by ‘the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total
number of members’ in either House of
Parliament. For more details, refer to (2010).
Federal Constitution: Reprint. Kuala Lumpur, The
Commissioner of Law Revision Malaysia.
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which asserts a chauvinistic pressure on
UMNO leaders when they make their political
calculations (Welsh 2013).

supermajority, the only government the nation
has ever known was still returned with 51 per
cent of the popular vote (Nohlen, Grotz et al.
2001). This new development also affects BN’s
capacity to project its narrative in the public
sphere. For one, this is because it entirely
exposes the importance of the rural
gerrymander in ensuring BN wins sufficient
seats in parliament, even while its vote has
fallen so far in percentage terms. Granted, BN
maintains a distinct advantage in rural seats in
which demographic and political tendencies
favour the operations of its campaign machinery,
namely certain of those known to largely
consist of Malay Muslim voters (Aspinall 2013).
Nevertheless, as one recent analysis
demonstrates, the gap in population size
between the largest and the smallest electoral
constituencies in Malaysia has grown steadily
since 1972, and as a result, the number of seats
dominated by Malay Muslim voter populations
now comprises 75.2 per cent of the total seats
(Lee Hock Guan 2013: 8).

Second, in addition to this result in the
federal parliament, BN no longer commands
institutional capacity in relation to the
resources and machineries associated with the
state governments of largely-urban Selangor
and Penang. Its loss of these diverse economic
and demographic hubs has also dented its
capacity to claim that it alone embodies and
represents the multi-racial national public. As a
result, BN can no longer claim that it alone can
bring this public together to overcome
imminent racial strife, guiding it instead toward
a common good: economic development.
Further, now that it can no longer make this
claim, it can also no longer write off largelyrural, agrarian and Malay Muslim-dominated
Kelantan—the only state it has failed to hold
for nearly the entire period since
independence—as an anomaly (Roff 1974;
Kessler 1978). Under the leadership of former
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad (19812003), for example, BN used to frequently make
both these claims to characterise support for
political alternatives as evidence of religious
fanaticism and anti-development stupidity
(Malhi 2003).

BN’s loss of the popular majority vote
also holds a deep narrative significance because
the 2013 result was not followed by ethnic
violence, as the 1969 election result was,
although that result was characterised by a loss
to BN of the supermajority alone, and not the
popular vote as well. Nor did the 2008 result
lead to violence, when the supermajority was
first lost for this, the second time. That violence
did not occur does not concord with the BNpropagated narrative of national and interethnic instability being the most likely result of
voters rejecting their permanent domination of
the federal parliament. Indeed, it is for this
reason that the question of violence, similar to
that which occurred in 1969, has been posed by
media commentators at every election since
Pakatan Rakyat’s emergence as an opposition

Third, a new loss of institutional
capacity, freshly inflicted by voters in May this
year, has also further eroded BN’s power over
the narrative it has constructed of the nation’s
foundation and subsequent development. This
was the critically important loss of the popular
vote, for the first time ever since the nation
came in to being. Despite winning government
by winning a majority of parliamentary seats,
BN won only 47 per cent of votes cast. Even in
1969, the first election in which BN (in its
previous avatar, the Alliance) lost its
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coalition, in successive iterations, since 1999.4
Most Malaysians today, however, do not
remember 1969, and it seems that recent
election results have done little to remind them
of it. This was despite Kuala Lumpur being on
high alert on the night of 5 May—election
night; with police check points established on
the deserted freeways leading in and out of
Kuala Lumpur, and a ban imposed on politically
partisan pedestrian and vehicular convoys.5

of experience, and indeed professionalisation,
commanded by certain sections of its
participants. It is therefore in the new media
public sphere that BN has most obviously
suffered a major blow to its capacity to conflate
its identity and interests with those of the
nation, especially since losing its exclusive
access to the other political enablers discussed
above.
These alternative national claims are
the subject of the full-length article that
expands on this half-length contribution to
Berita. Some of these claims operate as advances
on the institutional capacity inherent in the
legacy of the original constitution (Khoo 2013).
Others constitute assertions that PR ‘won the
election’, only to be blocked by the electoral
gerrymander and the Election Commission.6
Others function to withdraw from BN the
multi-ethnic currency which comes with
holding the nation’s diverse population centres,
accusing BN of anachronism and racism instead
(Malhi 2013). Additional claims serve to
differentiate the ‘national’ public—that of
Malaysian citizen-voters—from the extranational ‘constitutive outside’ populated by
foreign workers. These workers included the
‘planeloads’, or ‘40,000’ Bangladeshis alluded to
in the ‘get out the vote’ campaign run by PR,
the Sarawak Report and campaign pressure
group, Anyone But UMNO, along with the
electoral reform NGO, Bersih.

National Claim-Making
The new media has emerged as a
relatively free and open aspect of a global public
sphere in which Malaysians—regardless of
where they might live—participate to produce
and shape alternative narratives of the nation
and its trajectory (Castells 2008). Due to BN’s
lack of institutional capacity for maintaining
national structures of control around the new
public sphere, its capacity for national claimmaking is weakened. As a result, a genuine
recovery of alternative narratives appears to be
gathering pace, and these narratives are
increasingly recovered as forms of national
memory inscribed within digital networks, in
addition to functioning as campaign narratives
for Pakatan Rakyat. This recovery is afforded
not only by the relative freedom of the new
public sphere, but also by the increasing levels
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4 Refer, for one example from the many surely
which abound, to an interview I gave to Radio
2SER in Sydney. It is available at
http://www.2ser.com/component/k2/item/33
58-the-daily-3rd-may-2013-malaysians-headsto-the-polls.
5 From personal observation of driving on the
Federal Highway and the New Pantai
Expressway, in and out of the Lembah Pantai
electorate, centred on Bangsar on Kuala
Lumpur’s southwest boundary.
	
  

Ultimately, these new national claims
are also accompanied by an urge by sections of

	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6 For example, refer to recent comments to this
effect by Pakatan Rakyat’s Dato’ Seri Anwar
Ibrahim at the Adelaide Festival of Ideas in
October this year:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KESZYyzz
_MA.
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the pro-PR activist public to recover,
memorialise and celebrate alternative
possibilities extant in the period of the national
liberation struggle, when alternative
trajectories for Malaya and Malaysia appeared
possible. This urge was evident in the social
media circulation in September of images of
young activists displaying the Sang Saka
Malaya flag—a red and white standard
popularised by the 1940s Left, illegalised by the
Emergency Declaration of 1948. The flag is
controversial because it invokes a historical
vision of Malaysia as a republic, and appears to
blend the national flags of Singapore and
Indonesia.7 This urge was again evident in the
social media circulation of images, videos and
debating points after the funeral of Chin Peng,
leader of the Malayan Communist Party, in
Bangkok in September.8
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Feature Article

presented by Alexander R. Arifianto, Ronit
Ricci and myself (Eric C. Thompson).

Transforming Melayu Identities
in Maritime Southeast Asia
(By Eric Thompson)

I was also asked to act as a discussant
for the panel. Given the full set of five papers
and the presence of a large and engaged
audience, in the event, I deferred my
discussant’s comments in order to allow
substantial time for questions, answers and
discussion with the audience in attendance. It is
thus my pleasure to take this opportunity to
discuss the panel here in the pages of Berita. I
begin by discussing my own paper and
Arifianto’s, which both lay out conceptual and
methodological research agendas; then turn to
those of Sloane-White, Hardwick and Ricci,
each of which provided rich ethnographic cases
in which Melayu is an important, if contested,
term in the present.

Report: M SB-Sponsored Panel (San Diego
2013)
Alexander R. Arifianto (University of Miami)
Patricia Ann Hardwick (Independent Scholar)
Ronit Ricci (Australian National University)
Patricia Sloane-White (University of Delaware)
Eric C. Thompson (National University of
Singapore)
Melayu (or in English, “Malay”) has
been a signifier of identity for well over a
thousand years in the realm of Maritime
Southeast Asia. For at least as long as modern
scholarship has existed in the Malay world (or
Alam Melayu) the polyvalence of Melayuinspired reflection on its meaning and
significance – for instance in the works of the
nineteenth century author Munshi Abdullah. In
just the past decade, at least two important
volumes of collected essays have interrogated
the multiple instantiations of Melayu past and
present (Tim Barnard, ed. Contesting Malayness:
Malay Identity across Boundaries, 2004; Maznah
Mohamad and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied,
eds. Melayu: The Politics, Poetics and Paradoxes of
Malayness, 2011). The 2013 MSB Sponsored
Panel at the Association for Asian Studies built
on this critical engagement with Melayu
identities, by offering three new case studies
and two conceptual papers aimed at furthering
the field of Malay Studies. The panel was
organized by Patricia Sloane-White and
Patricia Hardwick, who both contributed papers
to the panel. Three additional papers were

Thompson’s paper (my own) was
entitled “Thinking through Islam and deracializing Melayu.” The paper presented at the
conference laid the groundwork for thinking
through how application of certain Quranic and
Arabic terms to the concept of Melayu might
challenge the racialization of that term which
occurred through the colonial and postcolonial
nationalist period – from the 18th and 19th
centuries into the present. Drawing mainly on
the mainstream English-language cannon of
Malay studies – authors such as Milner, Roff,
Nagata and others – the paper traced the broad
historical shifts in Melayu over fourteen or more
centuries. The main point of this narrative was
to demonstrate the shifting signification of
Melayu, for example from a toponym (placename) to ethnonym (name for people) and
across different points of reference of describing
a people, such as in place, polity, religion,
ethnicity or race. This history reminds us that
Melayu is a floating signifier par excellance. To
put it simply, the term Melayu has held powerful
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resonance over more than a dozen centuries
despite (or perhaps because of) the place or
people to which it refers has been elusive and
unstable.

struggles and early nation building. Arifianto
argued that while these contributions are well
documented in the Indonesian past, over the
past few decades there is an apparent silence
with regard to ongoing contributions of MalayIndonesians into the present.

Drawing on this historical context,
which points to the ways in which Melayu has
conceptually shifted over time, the paper turned
to two proposals for thinking about how
contemporary Islamic discourse in Malaysia
might be brought to bear on re-conceptualizing
and specifically de-racializing Malayu. First, the
paper challenged the implicit notion found in
English-language scholarship that the hybrid
sign Malay-Muslim could or should be
disentangled. Rather, we need to “examine their
integration and how the configuration and
meanings of Malay influence and intersect with
the meanings of Muslim and vice versa.” Second,
we should think through how terms drawn
from Quranic and Arabic sources might lead to
different ways of thinking about Melayu – in
particular, what might the consequences be of
thinking in terms of an umat Melayu as opposed
to bangsa (from Sanskrit) or ras (from English).
The former, the paper suggests, is a more open
system of relationship whereas both bangsa and
ras are closed systems based on blood ties. Of
course, at this stage, these remain suggestions
to be more fully developed through further
research and theorization.

To address this silence, Arifianto
outlined a plan of research – through archival
and textual materials, interviews and surveys –
to develop a better body of knowledge about the
place and endeavors of Malay-Indonesians in
more recent history and up to the present. On
the one hand, such a project would highlight
contributions of individuals who identify as
Malay within Indonesia. More broadly, it would
shed light on the meaning of Melayu in
contemporary Indonesia, which might go
beyond mere reference to Melayu as one among
a multitude of ethnic groups within Indonesia.
Sloane-White’s “Interrogating
Malayness: Islamic Transformations in the
Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) Cohort”
was the first of three case studies presented in
the panel. Sloane-White reported on follow-up
research to her 1990s work on Malay
entrepreneurialism. In this more recent work,
she has interacted with a more recent cohort of
MCKK old-boys. The earlier cohorts of MCKK
old boys identified with a particular brand of
Malay nationalism, which formed the
ideological basis for building Malay business
networks with strong ties to the Malaysian
government under the NEP from the 1970s
into the 1990s. The more recent cohort of
MCKK old-boys Sloane-White came to know –
who she calls ‘outlier’ old-boys – reject the
Malay-centered identity of the earlier cohorts in
favor of a more explicitly and exclusively
Muslim identity.

Arifianto’s paper, “Changing MalayIndonesian political identity in the early 21st
century,” similarly laid out a rationale and
framework for further research. Arifianto
outlined the historical role that MalayIndonesians, as the second largest ethnic group
after Javanese, have played in the social,
economic and political affairs of pre- and postindependence Indonesia. The paper provided an
overview of many contributions of Malay
individuals in the context of anti-colonial
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The paper argues that these Muslimidentified old-boys are forming their own
networks with strong Islamic sensibilities
through which they distinguish themselves
from and reject the values and business
practices of the NEP-era Malay or bumiputera
entrepreneurs. Sloane-White traces the
distinctive practices which distinguish these
newer, Muslim-identified entrepreneurs and
how they form networks in competition to the
older MCKK old-boy networks. At the same
time, she also argues that there are substantial
overlaps in these competing networks and
highlights certain ambivalences which throw
into question whether or not these networks
and the Islamic business ethics that underwrite
them auger substantive change in Malaysia’s
capitalist, developmental, and growth-oriented
political-economy.

values; but such acceptability must always be
negotiated. In the present, while MUIS
authorities have objected to at least some
elements of the kuda kepang, Hardwick
demonstrates various ways in which
practitioners synthesize kuda kepang with
Islamic piety. At the same time, she emphasizes
the ways in which the performance of kuda
kepang material ground senses of Malay identity
within cosmopolitan Singapore for its
practitioners.
Finally, Ronit Ricci’s paper provides yet
another and relatively unfamiliar case of the
instantiation of “Malay” in Sri Lanka. Ricci
recounts the history through which Malay came
to signify a particular group of people in Sri
Lanka who are descendants of various
individuals from the Indonesian archipelago –
despite the fact that many if not most of these
individuals might just as reasonably be
considered to be Javanese, Bugis or other nonMalay groups in Indonesia. In this regard,
Ricci’s case might usefully be compared to
Singapore or for that matter Malaysia, where
many “Malays” are of Javanese, Bugis,
Minangkabau or other descent, but have been
incorporated under the sign Melayu; a point that
Hardwick also makes.

In similar fashion, but in a far different
domain, Patricia Hardwick drew on recent
research in Singapore to discuss the contested
place of kuda kepang or hobby-horse trance
dance among contemporary Malay popular and
performing arts. Hardwick records that kuda
kepang is a flourishing practice in Singapore,
with the number of dance groups growing from
eight in the 1980s to somewhere between 40
and 60 at present with around 1,500
practitioners. In addition to describing the
dance itself, the paper provides ethnographic
vignettes of the sort of negotiations that go on
between practitioners, neighbors and the
authorities, particularly the police and the
Majlis Ugama Isalm Singapura (MUIS,
Singapore Islamic Religious Council).

The other particularly interesting part
of Ricci’s paper, which could be developed
further, is the way in which “Malay” has been
mobilized politically by this group of people
who want to carve out a space for themselves as
distinct from the more general category of
“Muslim.” Whereas in Malaysia and Singapore,
the terms Malay and Muslim have come to be
thought of as nearly synonymous, in Sri Lanka,
Malay has developed as a distinctive ethnonym
within a larger community of Muslims. Yet
again, we see the ways in which the notion of

One way to read Hardwick’s account is
as an example of how practices from outside of
Islamic history and tradition are brought into
alignment with Islamic value. In general, they
are acceptable if they are not against Islamic
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Malay or Melayu functions as a floating signifier
not only in the past by into the present.

in and beyond the Alam Melayu and the
certainty that no time soon might Melayu, in
Hang Tuah’s oft-quoted phrase, “hilang dunia”
(vanish from the world).

One might think, in light of the edited
volumes mentioned above and a wealth of other
scholarship past and present that all that could
be said about Malay and Melayu has been said;
but the papers presented here as well as the
lively reception they received at the March
2013 Association for Asian Studies Meeting
demonstrate that this is far from the case.
These, and certainly other work to come,
continue to contribute to ongoing and changing
understandings of Malay identities historically
and in the contemporary world. They are one
indication of the ongoing salience of Malayness

Eric C. Thompson is Associate Professor and Chair
of Graduate Studies in the Department of Sociology
at the National University of Singapore. He teaches
anthropology, gender studies, urban studies and
research methods. He has conducted research for over
two decades throughout Southeast Asia, primarily in
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. His
research interests include transnational networking,
gender studies, urbanism, culture theory, and
ASEAN regionalism.
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Speech Transcript

perpetrated in the name of Islam. I will not go
into the long depressing list of outrageous acts
against women and children justified in the
name of Islam that occurs daily throughout the
Muslim world. You are all too familiar with
them, and for us as Muslims living in the
Muslim world, we live them on a daily basis.

What Islam, Who’s Islam? The
Struggle for Women's Rights to
Equality and Justice in Muslim
Contexts
(By Zainah Anwar)

Enough is enough. Muslim women
today are taking charge, taking the lead to
define how religion today is understood and
practised and making our voices heard. We may
not be wearing the hijab, we may not be
speaking Arabic (only twenty percent of
Muslims live the Arab world, as too many
people often forget), we may not have a degree
in some branch or other of Islamic knowledge
from some Arab university, but we demand that
our experience of living Islam and being
impacted by laws and policies made in the name
of Islam give us the right and the authority to
decide and shape what Islam means and should
mean in our lives and as a source of law and
public policy.

Keynote Speech: Association for Asian
Studies Annual M eeting (San Diego 2013)
The setting
If God is just, if Islam is just, if Shariah
law is supposed to bring justice, then why do so
many laws, policies and practices made in the
name of Islam lead to injustice and
discrimination against women? This is the
question that confronts women’s groups today
all over the Muslim world and in minority
Muslim contexts as we struggle to end
discrimination against women, and face the
challenge of patriarchs in government and
Islamist groups who say that our demands for
equality and justice, for law reform are against
the teachings of Islam.

It is because women have borne the
brunt of this suffering in the name of religion,
that it is us women who have organised and are
at the forefront of our societies in pushing for
change in our understanding and practice of our
religion to recognise equality and justice and to
push for law reform to uphold these principles.

One of the most fundamental challenges
we as Muslims face today is the search for a
way to live our faith at a time when human
rights, women’s rights, and democracy
constitute the dominant ethical paradigm of the
modern world. In the twenty-first century,
there cannot be justice without equality. It is as
simple and undisputable as that.

But of course bringing change is never
easy. Those who have benefitted from the status
quo are resistant to change and use all kinds of
tactics to demonise and delegitimize the voice of
change.
Very often Muslim women who demand
justice and want to change discriminatory laws
and practices are told, ‘this is God’s law’ and are
therefore not open to negotiation and change.

As someone who believes that God is
just, that Islam is just, I am outraged that so
much injustice, cruelty, and violence are
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To question, challenge, or demand reform will
supposedly go against Shari‘ah, weaken our
faith in God and lead us astray from the
straight path. We are often accused of being
westernised elites, anti-Islam, anti-Shari’ah,
women who have deviated from our faith – our
aqidah, and our iman (faith) are weak. Reports
are made against us to the police, to the
religious authorities and to the Rulers as Heads
of religion to take action against us, to silence
us, to charge us for insulting Islam, to ban our
groups, ban our publications.

treated as human beings of equal worth and
dignity. We believe these principles and the
ideals of equality and justice are intrinsic in the
Qur’an and are also upheld in universal human
rights principles that regard all human beings
as equal. What could be more Islamic than the
first article of the UN Declaration on Human
Rights, which states, “All human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights”.

I should share with you a glimmer of
good news in this long struggle for justice. Just
last week, Sisters in Islam won our case against
the Malaysian Home Affairs Minister who
banned our book, on Muslim Women and the
Challenge of Islamic Extremism. The govt claimed
that our book was a threat to public order as it
confuses Muslims, especially women and those
whose faith is shallow! We took the govt to
court, we won at the High Court, the govt
appealed, we won again at the Court of Appeal
and the govt appealed yet again to the Federal
Court, the apex court and the Federal Court
threw out the govt’s leave for appeal. It was
music to our ears when one of the judges, in a
panel of five, that included two smart women,
said the Minister was supposed to apply his
mind to this case, he did not, instead he applied
the mind of the religious authorities.

There are numerous verses in the
Qur’an that provide for an ethical vision of
Islam, advocating the absolute moral and
spiritual equality of women and men. Verses
such as Surah 33:35 (on common and identical
spiritual and moral obligations placed on all
individuals regardless of sex); Surah 3:195
which declares that men and woman are
members, one of another; 2:187 which describes
Muslim men and women as each other’s
garments; 9:71, the final verse on the
relationship between men and women which
talks about them being each other’s ‘awliyya protecting friends and guardians - and the
obligations for both men and women, to enjoin
what is just and forbid what is evil, to observe
regular prayers, pay the zakat (tithe) and obey
Allah and his Messenger and they will be
equally rewarded. These verses are
unequivocally egalitarian in spirit and
substance and reflect the Qur'anic view on the
relationship between men and women.

Why is it so difficult to acknowledge
that women’s lives throughout the world have
changed? Our realities, our needs, our roles and
status have changed. For many of us who have
decided to engage with the religion, it is our
utter faith in a just God and a just Islam that
have made us embark on this perilous, but
compelling public struggle to push for an
understanding of Islam that recognises the
realities of our lives, and our yearning to be

This egalitarian vision also extends to
human biology. The verses on creation of men
and women talk about the characteristic of pairs
in creation (51:49, 53:45, 78:8, 50:7, 22:5, 36:36).
Since everything created must be in pairs, the
male and female must both be necessary, must
exist by the definition of createdness. Neither
one comes before the other or from the other.
One is not superior to the other, nor a
derivative of the other. This means that in
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Allah’s creation of human beings, no priority or
superiority is accorded to either man or woman.

The response to this challenge has led
to various forms of discourses on Islam and
rights. The discourse on women’s rights in
Islam can be categorized into three broad
strands:

It is this ethical voice of the Qur’an,
which insistently enjoins equality of all
individuals that has been largely absent in the
body of political and legal thought in Islam.
When women decided to read the Qur’an for
themselves, they discovered this ethical
message of equality and justice in Islam. They
began to question why this voice was silent in
the exegetical texts of the religion and the
codification of the laws. Who decided that these
verses in the Qur’an willl be put aside? Why
couldn’t these egalitarian and compassionate
verses be used to guide the laws governing
marital relations in Islam, while the verses that
could be read as discriminatory towards women
be the source of law and public policy?

First, there are those Muslims who
acknowledge that Islam indeed liberated
women and granted them rights unknown to
any other society. They point out the Qur’anic
injunctions that recognize a woman’s right to
contract marriage, to divorce, to inherit and
dispose of her property as she pleases. The
Qur’an also outlawed female infanticide and
enforced the payment of the dowry to the bride
herself, not to her father or guardian. Yet, while
progressive in tendency, this ethical vision of
equality and justice for women in the Qur'an did
not develop further or sustain any emancipatory
or egalitarian thrust within the Muslim juristic
heritage. Instead, the process of interpretation
and codification of the laws, dominated by male
jurists and scholars, eventually led to an
orthodox mainstream view that men and
women in effect are not equal.

In making these choices, whose
interests are served, protected, and advanced
and whose interests are shunted aside? Is this
really about living the will of God on earth as
these men in authority would like to dupe us
into believing or is it more about how they
could use the word of God to perpetuate
patriarchy and resist the changing realities
galloping before their eyes?

In responding to the international
discourse on women’s rights, such Muslims say
that because men and women are not the same,
there cannot be equality. Instead, they say that
in Islam men and women complement each
other and therefore what Islam recognizes is
equity, not equality. What is meant is that
because men and women are different, they
have separate and distinct roles to play. This
then leads to befuddled and contradictory
positions. They believe in the equal right of
women to education and to employment, but
not, for example, equal right to divorce.
Women can work outside the home, but only
with the permission of their husbands; women
can be doctors but they must not touch male
patients; women can be heads of departments in

The Challenge
The challenge we confront today is:
how do we as Muslims reconcile the tenets of
our faith to the challenge of modernity, of
plurality, of changing times and circumstances?
How do we deal with the new universal
morality of democracy, of human rights, of
women’s rights, and where is the place of Islam
in this dominant ethical paradigm of the
modern world?
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charge of men, but they cannot be in charge at
home for they must remain obedient to their
husbands.

Foremost for Muslim feminists of
course, is the issue of gender equality, of
women’s rights. This was an issue that Muslim
jurists never had to deal with until the late 19th
century, and an issue that they are still
grappling with over one hundred years later.

The second strand reflects the
obscurantist view that men and women are
inherently unequal in Islam, quoting verses in
the Qur'an such as 4:34 which talks about men
being responsible for women and 2:228 which
mentions that men are a “degree higher” than
women. Such verses are interpreted literally
and in isolation to legitimize men’s dominance
and superiority over women. Other verses in
the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet have
been interpreted to mean that women cannot be
leaders as they are weak and emotional, women
cannot work outside the home as they are best
suited to be wives and mothers in the service of
others, a woman’s voice is part of her awrah and
therefore cannot be heard in public. If at all
women can be educated, that education is not
meant for a career outside the home, but to help
women to be better wives and mothers.

Today the idea of gender equality,
which is integral to modern conceptions of
justice, creates what can be called an
‘epistemological crisis’ in the Muslim legal
tradition. The moral philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre argues that every rational inquiry is
embedded in a tradition of learning, and that
tradition reaches an epistemological crisis when,
by its own standards of rational justification,
disagreements can no longer be resolved
rationally. This, MacIntyre goes on, gives rise
to an internal critique that will eventually
transform the tradition, if the tradition is to
survive.
I find this concept useful to understand
and share with you what is going on today in
the Muslim world where thinkers and activists
are engaged in an internal critique in order to
reform a legal tradition governing family and
marriage that has lost its logic over time and
the ways in which feminists and scholars are
working together to construct new knowledge
in Islam, to rebuild a tradition that is able to
assimilate an idea once considered alien to
Islamic legal thought.

Over the past twenty years or so, there
has emerged a contemporary Muslim discourse
about women’s rights, human rights,
democracy, and modernity - led by Muslim
scholars and activists who advocate a review
and critical reexamination and re-interpretation
of the exegetical and jurisprudential texts and
traditions within Islam. This work places
emphasis on how religion is understood, how
religious knowledge is produced, and how
rights are constructed in the Islamic legal
tradition. It locates the production of religious
knowledge in the socio-historical context of its
time and asserts that given changing times and
circumstances, new religious knowledge needs
to be produced to deal with new challenges and
questions and issues that the tradition had not
dealt with.

This is a huge challenge of course,
especially in the context of Muslim societies
pummelled by the use and abuse of Islam for
political purposes. But for those of us in the
heart of this process of producing new
knowledge in Islam, it is an exciting journey,
intellectually, spiritually and politically as we
battle for what it means to be Muslim and
feminist in the 21st century.
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woman must obey her husband, the evidence of
two women equals one man, the husband has a
God-given right to take a second wife, and
therefore it is a sin for a woman to deny him
that right, that a wife has no right to say no to
sex with her husband, that hell is full of women
because they leave their heads uncovered and
are disobedient to their husbands.

The Path
Let me share with you the beginning.
How and why did women's groups like Sisters
in Islam and individual Muslim scholars,
women and men, many of whom have been
incredibly generous with their time and
scholarship in helping us activists, decide to
study the Qur'an and strive to hear the voice of
the divine will speaking to our concerns?

Where is the justice for women in all
these pronouncements? This questioning, and
above all, the conviction that Allah could never
be unjust, eventually led us to go back to the
primary source of our religion, the Qur’an. We
felt the urgent need to read the Qur’an for
ourselves and to find out if the Text actually
supported the oppression and ill-treatment of
women.

Like many other women's groups, it is
injustice, oppression and ill-treatment that
mobilized us Muslim women. Sisters in Islam
first got together because of our deep concerns
over the injustice women suffered under the
shariah system. As professional women and as
activists, other women often approached us to
confide their marital problems and the
meanness they faced when they approached the
religious authorities to seek redress to their
problems. We got together first to look into the
obstacles women faced in accessing their rights
under the Islamic Family law. The difficulties in
getting divorce, maintenance, a share of the
marital assets, custody and guardianship of
their children – all rights that exist under the
law, but given the gender bias in the system,
women face an uphill battle when their
husbands decide to challenge them. This was in
1987.

This process Sisters went through was
the most liberating and spiritually uplifting
experience for all of us. We took the path of
Iqraq (“Read", the first word revealed to
Prophet Muhammad saw) and it opened a world
of Islam that we could recognize, a world for
women that was filled with love and mercy and
with equality and justice. We need not look any
further to validate our struggle. Women’s
rights were rooted in our tradition, in our faith.
We were more convinced than ever that it is
not Islam that oppresses women, but
interpretations of the Qur’an influenced by
cultural practices and values of a patriarchal
society that regard women as inferior and
subordinate to men.

However, increasingly, we felt that
dealing with law alone was not enough. We felt
angry and powerless in the face of complaints
by women that they have to suffer in silence in
the face of advice from the religious authorities
and hearing talks, again and again, in religious
classes, over radio and television, where women
were often told that men are superior to
women, that men have authority over women,
that a man has a right to beat his wife, that a

For much of Islamic history, it is men
who have interpreted the Qur’an and the
traditions for us. The woman’s voice, the
woman’s experience, the woman’s realities had
been silent and silenced in the reading and
interpretation of the Text. The silence of the
interpretive voice was seen as the silence of the
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Text. But when Sisters read the Text, we
discovered words, messages and meanings that
we were never exposed to in all the traditional
education on Islam that we went through in our
lives.

practice would prevail and be the source of
codified law in this modern world, to govern
our private and public lives and punish us if we
fail to abide, and which would fall by the
wayside? On what basis is that decision made?
Whose interests are protected and whose
interests are denied? It was clear to us that the
outcome of this process was more about power,
privilege and politics rather than living the
divine will on earth.

For us, it was the beginning of a new
journey of discovery. It was a revelation to us
that the verse on polygamy (Sura an-Nisa, 4:3)
explicitly said “…if you fear you shall not be
able to deal justly with women, then marry only
one.” Why is it that one half of the verse that
said a man can have up to four wives becomes
universally known and accepted as a right in
Islam and is codified into law, but the other half
of the very same verse that promotes
monogamy is largely unheard of until women
began to read the Qur’an for ourselves.

As feminists, as believers, and as
activists living within a democratic
constitutional framework, we decided to assert
and claim our right to have our VOICE heard
in the public sphere and to intervene in the
decision-making process on matters of religion
that must take into consideration the realities of
our lives and the justice enjoined by the Qur’an.

It dawned on us that when men read
the verse, they only saw “marry up to four
wives.” In that phrase, they saw the word of
God that validated their desire and their
experience of multiple sexual partners. When
women read the verse, we clearly saw “… if you
fear you cannot deal justly with women, then
marry only one.”

The Challenge
As we continue to study, to campaign
for women’s rights, for the right for people like
us who did not go to that venerable university
in Egypt for the study of Islam, al- Azhar, and
who cannot speak Arabic, and who are not
covered up, to participate in matters of religion,
we know the task before us is uphill.

Those were the words of Allah that
spoke to our fears of injustice. We understood
that the right to polygamy was conditional, and
if a man cannot fulfill those conditions of equal
and just treatment, then Allah said marry only
one. In fact the verse goes on to say “… this
will be best for you to prevent you from doing
injustice.” What further validation do we need
to argue that polygamy is not a right in Islam,
but is actually a responsibility allowed only in
exceptional circumstances?

Through our readings, through
consultations and studies with progressive
Islamic scholars inside and outside the country,
through networking with other women's
groups engaged in the same struggle, we
claimed our right and created a public space for
women like us to stand up and argue for justice
and equality for Muslim women in contentious
areas such as polygamy, equal rights, dress and
modesty, domestic violence, hudud laws, and
freedom of expression, freedom of religion and
other fundamental liberties.

The question that arose was obvious to
us: WHO decides which interpretation, which
juristic opinion, which hadith, which traditional
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SIS Advocacy Work

liberties, or conflict with the federal
constitution and with civil law, offer a
justification for why these laws should be
amended or repealed and then provide specific
wordings or positions to make clear the
changes that we want to see take place.

Central to our advocacy work, is the
creation of a public voice and a public
constituency to recognise equality and justice
between women and men in Islam, and
consequently to demand for reform of laws and
politics made in the name of Islam that
discriminate against women. There are several
strategies that Sisters in Islam used to achieve
this:

We also have an extensive public
education program where we conduct regular
study sessions, training workshops on women’s
rights in Islam all over the country. We also
run a legal clinic that has served over 8,000
women over the years, providing gendersensitive legal advice on matters under the
Islamic family law and Syariah criminal law.

From the start, we used the letters to
the editor column in the newspapers to create a
public voice for ourselves and our alternative
understanding of various contentious issues in
Islam – be it domestic violence, polygamy, dress
and modesty, equality, leadership, etc. By
challenging the traditional discriminatory views
and quoting alternative interpretations and
juristic opinions within Islam, and using legal
concepts that enable change and diversity, we
hoped to engender a more informed public
discussion on the issue and build a constituency
that would support our advocacy and pressure
the Government to take into consideration an
understanding of Islam that upholds the
principles of equality, justice, freedom and
dignity.

Our work of course has had an
international impact. Our question and answer
booklets on a range of issues, including
equality, domestic, violence, polygamy, family
planning, have been translated into other
languages for use by women’s groups in other
Muslim countries. We are also invited to
conduct trainings on women’s rights in Islam
from different parts of the Muslim world and
build the capacity of Muslim women activists
who feel the necessity to reconcile the teachings
of Islam with human rights and women’s rights.
All this have of course led to Sisters in
Islam taking the initiative to launch Musawah,
the Global Movement for Equality and Justice
in the Muslim family in 2009.

Second, we submit memorandums and
letters to the Government on issues such as the
appointment of women as judges in Shari’ah
courts, the right of Muslim women to equal
guardianship of their children, Reform of the
Islamic Family Law, Reform of the Shari’ah
Criminal Laws, and the Administration of
Justice in the Shari’ah System.

Given the frustrations and opposition
Muslim women activists faced in trying to push
for reform of the discriminatory Islamic Family
law, we felt it was important that all us who
have for decades struggled against patriarchs in
government, society, and our private lives to
recognise our right to equality, should come
together and create a very collective
international public voice demanding our rights

In these memorandums, we express our
concerns on provisions in the law that
discriminate against women in substance or
implementation, or violate fundamental
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to equality and justice. Thus Musawah, which
means equality, was launched in February 2009
with over 250 participants from 47 countries. It
was an exciting moment that until today we
savour.

The attacks and condemnations usually
take three forms: first, they undermine our
right and our legitimacy to speak on Islam by
questioning our credentials. They say we have
no right to speak on Islam because we are not
traditionally educated in religious schools, we
do not have a degree in Islam from a recognized
Arab university, we do not speak Arabic, and
we do not cover our heads. They say we are
western-educated feminists representing an
elite strata of society who are trying to impose
alien western values on Islam and the ummah.
To them, the discourse on Islam is therefore
exclusive only to a certain group of Muslims,
the ulama with the right education, status, and
position. Others do not have the right to
express their opinions on Islam.

What Musawah hopes to bring to the
larger women’s and human rights movement is
this:
• An assertion that Islam can be a source
of empowerment, not a source of
oppression and discrimination.
• An effort to open new horizons for
rethinking the relationship between
Islam and human rights, equality and
justice.
• An offer to open a new constructive
dialogue where religion is no longer an
obstacle to equality for women, but a
source for liberation.
• A collective strength of conviction and
courage to stop governments and
patriarchal authorities, and ideological
non-state actors from the convenience
of using religion and the word of God
to silence our demands for equality,
and
• A space where activists, scholars,
decision makers, working within the
human rights or the Islamic framework,
or both, can interact and mutually
strengthen our common pursuit of
equality and justice for Muslim women.

Second, they accuse us of having
deviated from our faith. They equate our
questioning and challenging of their
obscurantist views on women and fundamental
liberties, and their interpretations of the Qur'an
as questioning the word of God, and therefore
they say we doubt the infallibility of God and
the perfection of the message. Consequently, we
are accused of being against Islam. They also
accuse us of using our brains, logic and reason
(akal) instead of referring to classical exegetical
and jurisprudential texts of the early centuries
of Islam. They claim that these texts by the
great theologians and jurists of centuries past
have perfected the understanding of Islam and
the doors of ijtihad should therefore remain
closed.

Of course by claiming our right and
creating the space to speak out in public on
Islam, we have made enemies. We are often
criticised by conservative scholars and Islamist
activists – a common experience of other
women’s groups and progressive scholars in
other Muslim countries.

Third, they contend that it is dangerous
to offer alternative opinions and interpretations
of the religion as this could confuse the ummah
and lead to disunity. There can only be one
interpretation to be decided upon by the ulama
and all citizens must abide by this
interpretation. They accuse us of promoting the
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ideology of “liberal Islam” which is deviant and
dangerous as it imposes alien ideas onto
Muslim society.

It must be understood that while all
Muslims accept that the Qur’an as one, the
human effort in interpreting the Qur’an had
always led to diverse and differing opinions. It
is precisely because of this wealth of diversity
that Islam has survived and flourished to this
day in different cultures and societies – all could
accommodate the universal message of Islam.
And yet in many Muslim societies today, there
are many who condemn those who offer
alternative views as infidels and apostates and
choose to deny or negate the richness,
complexity and diversity of our heritage.

However, for us it is ironic that many of
those who often challenge and question the
credentials of women’s groups to speak on
Islam, themselves do not speak Arabic and have
not been traditionally educated in Islam. Many
of those at the vanguard of the Islamist
movement calling for the establishment of an
Islamic state and supremacy of shariah rule
today are professionals - engineers, doctors,
academics, administrators, without any formal
religious training. Actually, many of them are
third-rate engineering graduates from thirdrate American universities. (Someone’s got to
study this correlation). Their right to speak out,
however, is not questioned. The issue therefore
is not so much about who has a right to speak
on Islam, but what is being said about Islam.
Thus those who echo the mainstream view on
men’s rights and women’s inferior status in
Islam, those who believe in the leadership of the
mullahs, and those who advocate the
establishment of an Islamic state and imposition
of Islamic laws, have the right to speak on
Islam, but those who challenge these views are
denied the right and legitimacy to speak out.

There is also a denial of the historical
context within which the Islamic law itself was
constructed, and of the consequently historical
character of the corpus of the Islamic legal
tradition as it was developed and applied within
early and classical Islamic civilisation.
For example, in classical Islamic
jurisprudential texts, gender inequality is taken
for granted, a priori, as a principle. Women are
depicted as “sexual beings” not as “social
beings” and their rights are discussed largely in
the context of family law. The classical jurists’
construction of women’s rights reflected the
world in which they lived where inequality
between women and men was the natural order
of things and women had little role to play in
public life.

The claim made by such Islamist forces
that only their perspective and interpretation of
Islam, of its values and its view of human rights
and women’s rights are the “universal” and
legitimate view for all Muslims at all times
must be challenged. In the face of general
ignorance, fear or indifference by the public at
large, the obscurantist view of the traditional
ulama and Islamist activists on issues such as
women's rights, shariah law and fundamental
liberties have dominated the Islamic agenda in
much of the Muslim world, and seen as the
gospel truth of Islam by the Western world.

But the conservative ulama that
dominate the religious authorities and Islamist
activists of today seem unable or unwilling to
see Islamic law from a historical perspective as
rules that were socially constructed to deal with
the socioeconomic and political context of the
time, and that given a different context, these
laws have to change to ensure that the eternal
principles of justice are served. In this process,
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it is human agency that determines which texts
are relevant, and how they should be
interpreted to serve the best interest of the
community. While the source is divine as it is
the revealed word of God, human
understanding of the word of God is a human
construct that is fallible and changeable in
accordance with changing times and
circumstances. Therefore the role of human
experience and intellect in the pursuit of the
divine, will lead to the production of Islamic
knowledge and Islamic laws that cannot then be
regarded as divine.

and codify the text in a manner that very often
isolates the text from the socio-historical
context of its revelation, isolates classical
juristic opinion especially on women’s issues,
from the socio-historical context of the lives of
the founding jurists of Islam, and isolates our
textual heritage from the context of
contemporary society, the world that we live in
today.
I feel very strongly that the role played
by civil society groups, such as women’s rights
and human rights activists, and public
intellectuals will be key in bringing about
change in the terms of public engagement on
Islam in many Muslim societies.

They can therefore be changed,
criticised, refined and redefined. Unfortunately,
in the traditional Islamic education most of our
ulama have gone through, the belief in taqlid
(blind imitation) and that the doors of ijtihad are
closed is so strong. This rationale is based on
the belief that the great scholars of the classical
period who lived closer to the time of the
Prophet were unsurpassed in their knowledge
and interpretative skills.

For this to happen, however, the public
space to debate on Islam and Islamic issues has
to open up. Ironically, post-September 11 was a
wake-up call to many Muslims. One important
impact in a number of Muslim countries has
been the opening of the public space for debate,
for discussion, for a diversity of opinion on
Islam and Islamic issues to be heard in the
public sphere, from both Muslims and people of
other faiths.

But to adopt such an attitude is totally
untenable in today’s world when we face new
and different challenges: the issue of human
rights, of democracy, of women’s rights, the
challenge of modernity, the challenge of change.
How do we find solutions from within our faith
if we do not exert in ijtihad and produce new
knowledge and new understandings of Islam in
the face of new problems?

In many parts of the Muslim world and
within minority Muslim communities, scholars,
writers, and activists are beginning to debate
such issues publicly: What is the role of religion
in politics? Is Islam compatible with
democracy? Who has the right to interpret
Islam and codify Islamic teachings into laws
and public policies? How do we deal with the
conflict between modern constitutional
provisions of fundamental liberties and equality
with religious laws and policies that violate
these provisions? Should the state legislate on
morality? Is it the duty of the state, in order to
bring about a moral society, to turn all sins into
crimes against the state? Can there be one truth

This problem is compounded by the
fact that most Muslims have traditionally been
educated to believe that only the ulama have a
right to talk about Islam. What are the
implications to democratic governance, to
human rights and gender justice, if only a small
group of people, the ulama, as traditionally
believed, have the right to interpret the Qur’an,
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and one final interpretation of Islam that must
govern the lives of every Muslim citizen of the
country? Can the massive coercive powers of a
modern nation-state be used to impose that one
truth on all citizens? How do we deal with the
new universal morality of democracy, of human
rights, of women’s rights, and where is the
place of Islam in this dominant ethical paradigm
of the modern world?

process of dialogue, of policy-making and law
making.
This search for answers to important
questions on the role of Islam in today’s modern
nation state cannot remain the exclusive
preserve of the religious authorities, be they the
ulama in government or in the opposition
parties or Islamist activists pushing for an
Islamic state and shariah law.

The Arab Spring and the transition to
democracy, while spewing out undemocratic
forces to the fore, also provides an opportune
space for diverse voices to speak out. It is in this
context that Musawah’s work at the global
level becomes urgent as we build knowledge
and build an ever expanding pool of activists
with the knowledge and courage to stand up,
speak out and challenge the use of Islam to
discriminate against women and violate
fundamental liberties, and offer an alternative
vision of the possibilities and necessity for
reform.

For me the hope for change lies in the
growing voices of dissent against intolerant,
oppressive and discriminatory teachings of the
religion, the opening up of the public space, and
the breakdown in the monopoly that the
traditional religious authorities have over the
discourse on Islam. The democratization
project in Muslim countries today go must go
hand in hand with the debate on the public role
of Islam. You cannot demand for more
democracy, justice and respect for human rights
on the one hand in order to get rid of an
oppressive state, and at the same time demand
that all these principles stop at the door of
Islam. That somehow, Islamic law and policies
cannot, should not be put to the same test that
you demand of the despotic rulers. Public law
must be opened to public debate. Even if the
law is made in the name of religion, it is no
longer tenable to hide behind the sanctity of the
divine to silence dissent.

Within the context of modernizing
Malaysia, Sisters in Islam takes the position
that if religion is to be used to govern the public
and private lives of its citizens, then everyone
has a right to talk about religion and express
their views and concerns on the impact of such
laws and policies made in the name of Islam.
The world is far more complex today then it
ever was. No one group can have the exclusive
monopoly on knowledge. In a modern
democratic nation-state, ijtihad must therefore
be exercised in concert and through democratic
engagement with the ummah. The experience of
others who have been traditionally excluded
from the process of interpreting, defining and
implementing Islam must be included. The role
of women who constitute half of the ummah
must be acknowledged and included in this

The challenge is to expand this public
space, to open up the debate, to turn the
dissenting voices into a clamor for justice and
equality, for freedom and dignity at the
national, regional and international levels.
Women’s groups in Muslim countries are
already organizing and building bridges across
regions to multiply their voices and to take the
lead in reforming the teachings and
understanding of Islam to deal with the
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Autumn	
  2013	
  

	
  

	
  
Berita	
  

36	
  

_______________________________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
challenges of the modern world. Musawah is
already acknowledged as a key international
actor in this endeavour. For truly, nothing is
more powerful than an idea whose time has
come.

answers to deal with our changing times and
circumstances. For us in Sisters in Islam, this is
not heretical, but an imperative if religion is to
remain relevant to our lives, to be a source of
peace, and a source of goodness, rather than a
source of conflict, cruelty and oppression.

How we live our faith in this world
remains a work in progress, an exciting work in
progress actually. The challenge is not just for
Muslims, but also for Christians, Jews, Hindus,
Buddhists and all who believe in justice. That
there is a resurgence of faith in public life is
obvious. There is a yearning for the
transcendence, for spirituality, for faith in an
age of rapid change and all the uncertainties
and fear of the unknown that change brings.

The task is long, difficult and
challenging; but I believe it is necessary and it
is possible, and it is exciting. It is a task that we
as citizens of modern nation-states, of an
increasingly interdependent globalised world
must care about and must engage in.

Zainah Anwar is a founding member and former
Executive Director of Sisters in Islam, a Malaysian
non-governmental organisation working on
women’s rights within the Islamic framework.
Zainah is currently the Director for Musawah, a
global movement for equality and justice in the
Muslim family. She also writes a monthly column on
politics, religion and women’s rights, called Sharing
the Nation, in the Sunday Star, Malaysia. She is a
former member of the Human Rights Commission of
Malaysia. Her book, Islamic Revivalism in
Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students (Pelanduk:
1987), has become a standard reference for the study
of Islam in Malaysia.

As a Muslim, I do not believe that a
simplistic call to return to an idealized golden
age of Islam that has little bearing to the
realities of today's world can be the answer.
And yet the answers can be found within our
faith, a faith that is engaged with our lived
realities, with the human rights principles we
believe in, and with our constitutional
framework that recognizes equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of gender. What we
need is the intellectual vigor, the moral
courage, and the political will to strive for a
more enlightened and progressive
understanding of our faith in our search for
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